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Abstract  
The perception of mobile payment procedures’ security by the customer is one major factor for the 
market breakthrough of the according systems. In this paper we examine security issues in mobile 
payment from the viewpoint of customers. Based on theoretical research we analyze empirical data 
from the MP2 mobile payment study with 8295 respondents in order to develop a set of dimensions, 
categories and aspects. The results do have a scientific as well as a practical impact: They provide a 
basis for the selection of appropriate indicators for further empirical studies. Furthermore they can 
serve as a guideline for mobile payment service providers in order to prevent security concerns 
through appropriate design and communication of payment procedures and to convince customers of 
the security of their mobile procedures by meeting concerns in informative advertising. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Mobile payment (MP) is expected to become one of the most important applications in mobile 
commerce (Varshney & Vetter 2002). Since companies are not going to invest in the development of 
innovative mobile applications or services unless they can be charged for appropriately, the existence 
of standardized and widely accepted mobile payment (MP) procedures is crucial for the development 
of mobile commerce (Pousttchi & Selk & Turowski 2002, Dahlberg & Mallat & Öörni 2003). 
Whereas in electronic commerce we still see an important role of traditional payment systems (e.g. 
Krueger & Leibold & Smasal 2006), a payment system for mobile commerce will be typically not 
adequate until it shares fundamental characteristics of the mobile offer it is to bill for, in particular its 
ubiquity (Pousttchi & Selk & Turowski 2002, Coursaris & Hassanein 2002, Mallat 2004). As a result 
MP is crucial for, but not limited to the mobile commerce scenario as we will show later. Pousttchi 
and Wiedemann (2005) show how customers benefit from an MP procedure: The most important 
relative advantages over conventional payment systems1 are ubiquity (the accessibility of a procedure 
and the reachability of payees at any time from any location), the ability to handle micropayments 
(smaller than 10 EUR /USD), the avoidance of cash at vending machines, and faster conduction of 
payments (e.g. customer-to-customer transactions in the use case scenario online auction).  
According to the unanimous forecasts of the years 1999/2000 (for examples see e.g. Taga & Karlsson 
2004) mobile phones should by now have been firmly established as payment terminals in the most 
diverse fields. However, whereas merchants and Mobile Payment Service Providers (MPSP) made a 
multitude of attempts to offer respective services, absence of wide customer acceptance of the offered 
procedures prevented a market breakthrough in most markets up to now. In addition to the lack of 
standardization and universality of the procedures, security concerns of customers are one of the main 
inhibitors (Pousttchi 2005, Ketterer & Stroborn 2002, Ehrhardt 2002, Zieschang 2002). 
Although the issue of security has emerged as a major inhibitor of mobile payment acceptance, the 
research on this issue is quite rare to date, especially from the viewpoint of customers. Therefore, this 
study seeks to approach the issue from the empirical perspective in order to come to a better 
understanding of the concept. Based on the basic distinction of the dimensions objective and subjective 
security arising from our theoretical research we analyze empirical data with the aim to extract 
relevant statements and aggregate them to statement groups and categories. For this analysis we 
employ the data of the MP2 mobile payment study with 8295 respondents which collected data for 40 
use cases in different payment scenarios and amount levels.  
The outcome of the paper is an empirically developed set of dimensions, categories and aspects which 
is of scientific as well as of practical importance: They provide a basis for the selection of appropriate 
indicators for further empirical studies. Furthermore they can serve as a guideline for MPSP in order 
to prevent security concerns through appropriate design and communication of payment procedures 
and to convince customers of the security of their mobile procedures by meeting concerns in 
informative advertising. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we define mobile payment and provide 
related work. In section 3 we describe the research methodology. In section 4 we present and discuss 
our results: In section 4.1 we identify the relevant dimensions. In 4.2 we derive categories and 
statement groups of subjective security. Section 4.3 presents implications and recommendations for 
MPSP. In section 5 we summarize and outline the main findings.  
                                              
1 Please note that our discussion of a general payment method, such as credit card usage, electronic payment, or MP, refers to 
the term payment systems. When we talk about concrete solutions such as Paybox or Crandy, we use the term payment 
procedures. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Mobile Payment 
On closer examination we have to differentiate two basic functions of MP: payments inside and 
outside mobile commerce (Pousttchi 2005). Inside mobile commerce MP is used for payments of 
mobile offers and is ideally system inherent. In the area of charging mobile services we distinguish 
two basic terms: mobile billing and mobile payment. We refer to mobile billing as billing of 
telecommunication services by a mobile network operator or a mobile virtual network operator within 
an existing billing relationship (Turowski & Pousttchi 2004). We define mobile payment as that type 
of payment transaction processing in the course of which – within an electronic procedure – (at least) 
the payer employs mobile communication techniques in conjunction with mobile devices for initiation, 
authorization or realization of a payment (Pousttchi 2003). If a mobile payment procedure is provided 
by an MNO/MVNO, we will have the intersection of mobile billing and mobile payment. 
Outside mobile commerce, an MP procedure can be understood as a mobile commerce application to 
complete payments in different situations. For this purpose four general settings – referred to as 
payment scenarios – are to be considered (Kreyer & Pousttchi & Turowski 2002b, and the extension 
in Khodawandi & Pousttchi & Wiedemann 2003): transactions on the stationary Internet (electronic 
commerce scenario), at any kind of vending machine (stationary merchant automat scenario), in 
traditional retail (stationary merchant person scenario) and between end-customers (customer-to-
customer scenario).  
2.2 Related Work 
Security and privacy concerns of transactions are not novel concepts (Westin 1967). At merchants 
with no good reputation consumers have always been concerned about using debit or credit cards. This 
real world example holds also true for commercial transactions on the Internet (Chellappa & Pavlou 
2002). Hence, Friedman, Kahn and Howe (2000) and Shneiderman (2000) argue that improving 
positive security and privacy perceptions are most important for sustained activity in electronic 
commerce. 
Security issues in electronic payment procedure have already had a significant amount of discussion in 
the literature (e.g. Ketterer & Stroborn 2002, Strube 2002, Zieschang 2002). In order to evaluate 
possible risks related with electronic payment procedures, Reichenbach (2001) uses criteria of 
multilateral security (Rannenberg 1989) and refines them. Also Jakubowicz, Hanssens and Henriksen 
(2003) develop a framework for analyzing the risks involved in electronic payments. They include the 
scenarios in which there may be a loss of money or privacy, the probability of these scenarios and the 
major possible negative consequences. Both approaches are based on the individual and therefore 
subjective viewpoints of the researchers. This entails the risk that relevant issues are not included and 
might lead to a loss of information, or that irrelevant issues are taken into account without any 
information gain (Fürtjes 1982).  
Chari, Kermani, Smith and Tassiulas (2000) argue that mobile commerce solutions differ from 
electronic commerce solutions because the underlying technology has basic differences which create a 
range of new security exposures. For instance, the portability of mobile devices makes theft, loss, and 
damage of client devices much more likely. Therefore they assume that also the perception of security 
in mobile commerce may differ from that one in electronic commerce.  
Examining barriers to adoption of MP, Khodawandi, Pousttchi and Wiedemann (2003) indicate that 
the lack of perceived security (later defined as subjective security) is the most frequently called reason 
for a refusal. Rogger and Celia (2004) found similar results. Little empirical research has been 
undertaken to understand the nature of the concept perceived security regarding mobile commerce and 
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especially mobile payment. A notable exception is the study of Dahlberg, Mallat and Öörni (2003). 
They identify six different types of security risks in focus group interviews. The differences between 
their study and the study at hand lies in the level of detail of the results (section 4.2) and the greater 
sample size (46 for Dahlberg et al. versus 3930 extracted from the MP2, as shown in section 3).  
3 METHOD 
Empirical research on security from the end-customers’ viewpoint faces a major problem: Theoretical 
concepts like security are too abstract and generally formulated to allow a direct definition of 
indicators to measure them or to use them for informative advertising. Thus, it is necessary to specify 
their content. For this purpose, we use a method called concept-specification (Schnell & Hill & Esser 
1999) that originates from the social sciences and is used here to break down the concept of security 
into dimensions, categories and statement groups. The concept-specification follows a step-by-step 
approach.  
In a first step, the concept security is split into relevant dimensions. On the top level we use the 
security definition of Kreyer, Pousttchi and Turowski (2002b) who distinguish between the 
dimensions objective and subjective security as described in section 4.1. After that, a much more 
detailed splitting into categories and statement groups is undertaken. To minimize the risks mentioned 
in section 2.2 (Fürtjes 1982), categories and statement groups are derived from the results of the study 
MP2 which was conducted by the University of Augsburg from August 2003 to January 2004 with the 
participation of 8295 respondents. This study is based on an online questionnaire according to Dillman 
(2000) and mainly aims to analyze the different payment scenarios and concrete use cases. Besides 
demographic questions and other questions related to MP (for detailed results see Eisenmann & Linck 
& Pousttchi 2004), respondents were asked the open-ended question “What would you require to feel 
secure about using mobile payments?” The aim of this question was to explore categories and 
statement groups of subjective security. We decided in favor of an open-ended question because this 
allows people to express themselves in their own words which lead consequently to richer, more 
detailed information (Schnell & Hill & Esser 1999, Friedrichs 1990). In order to avoid drawbacks of 
open-ended questions the opportunity to answer “no response” was explicitly offered.  
The answers were analyzed by first sifting all statements and then categorizing them into statement 
groups. As very detailed answers were given partly it was necessary to form large numbers of 
statement groups. The statement groups were afterwards summarized to categories (Schnell & Hill & 
Esser 1999). The category names presented in section 4.2 represent the most frequent statements. In 
order to achieve a usable and thus manageable result we tried to restrict the analysis to the category 
level wherever possible and extended it to the level of statement groups only when a significant 
number of statements showed up in these or important information was contained at the lower level. 
After we have illustrated the concept-specification, we will now describe the sample of the study. We 
checked plausibility, integrity and completeness of the 8295 received questionnaires with the result 
that 6343 could be used for further analysis. The sample was not a representative sample of the total 
population (since already the appliance of an online questionnaire prevents this). However, the sample 
was relatively balanced in demographic aspects, e.g. 0.6% were younger than 16 years, 5.8% between 
16 and 20 years, 22.6% between 21 and 25 years, 22.8% between 26 and 30 years, 29.7% between 31 
and 40 years, 12.8% between 41 and 50 years und 5.6% older than 50 years. The most important 
occupational groups are salaried employees (43.6%), students (27.3%) and self-employed persons 
(10.5%). The affinity to technology and their adoption among the respondents was very high (for a 
more detailed description of the sample see Eisenmann & Linck & Pousttchi 2004). 
In view of the highest education attained we can believe that most of respondents had no problem with 
expressing their own opinion regarding the open-ended question. Since completing the questionnaire 
took about 20 minutes, we assume that it was necessary for most of the respondents to have a certain 
interest in MP. Moreover, when talking to MPSP about their target group we see remarkable 
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similarities to the sample represented above. Also respondents’ direct statements let the sample appear 
as the target group for MP: While even 14.8% indicated that they have already used a MP procedure, 
only 6.9% took no stock in MP. Our conclusion is that we can not make general statements about 
security concerns of the total population but very well of the current MP target group. Thus, with 
regard to the objective of the study the sample seems to be ideal. 
4 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 Dimensions of Security 
Examining the conditions for actual utilization of MP procedures from the viewpoint of customers, 
Pousttchi (2003) differentiates between essential and commensurate conditions. Fulfilling all essential 
conditions causes a customer to accept a MP procedure as a usable method of payment in principle. 
However, the infringement of one single essential condition will prevent the customer from using the 
procedure. Fulfilling one of the commensurate conditions could turn, then, this acceptance into actual 
usage. Each of these two represents a single step of change of the customer's attitude towards MP.  
The issue of acceptance of MP procedures has already had a significant amount of discussion in the 
literature (e.g. Dahlberg & Mallat & Penttinen & Sohlberg 2002, Ding & Hampe 2003). For the 
customer, the arguments can typically be subsumed into three aspects: security, costs and convenience 
(Kreyer & Pousttchi & Turowski, 2002a), put in an order of relevance according to Pousttchi (2003). 
Essential conditions may occur as functionality requirements such as the capability to pay in a certain 
scenario or to use a certain method of settlement. Typically, these can also be assigned to the above 
aspects. 
In this paper, we focus on the essential condition “security” that is of prime importance for customers 
accepting a MP procedure (Kieser 2001, Khodawandi & Pousttchi & Wiedemann 2003, Rogger & 
Celia 2004). According to Kreyer, Pousttchi and Turowski (2002b) we distinguish the concept security 
between the two dimensions objective and subjective security. Objective security is a concrete 
technical characteristic, given, when a certain technological solution responds to all of five security 
objectives: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, authorization and non-repudiation (Merz 2002). In 
table 1 we define these security objectives and name technologies and criteria securing MP. 
 
Security objective Definition Enabling concept/technique 
Confidentiality Property that ensures that transaction 
information cannot be viewed by 
unauthorized persons 
Encryption  
Authentication Property that the transaction information 
actually originates from the presumed 
transaction partner 
Possession (e.g. of a mobile phone), 
knowledge (e.g. of a PIN) und property 
(e.g. biometric property)  
Integrity Property that the transaction information 
remains intact during transmission and 
cannot be altered 
Digital signatures  
Authorization Property that parties involved must be able 
to verify if everyone involved in a 
transaction is allowed to make the 
transaction 
Digital certificates  
Non-repudiation Property that no one should be able to claim 
that the transaction on his/her behalf was 
made without their knowledge 
Digital signatures  
Table 1. Sub-goals of objective security according to Merz (2002) 
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In recent years also the availability of a system is frequently called which provides functionality to 
ensure that the service is accessible and usable (Turowski & Pousttchi 2004).  
As it is unlikely that the average customer is able to evaluate the objective security of a procedure (e.g. 
Egger & Abrazhevich 2001), the essential condition for MP acceptance is the perception of security. 
In the following we denote the latter as subjective security. Subjective security is defined as the degree 
of the perceived sensation of the procedures’ security from the viewpoint of the customer. Therefore, 
subjective security can be seen as the mirror image of risk affinity. 
It is important to mention that the two dimensions objective and subjective security are neither disjoint 
nor independent. As subjective security has no effect on objective security, the empirical results in 
section 4.2 can only affect subjective security whereas objective security itself stays with the sub-goals 
from table 1 as categories. However, the other way round, the level of objective security influences the 
level of subjective security. This can be seen in the great amount of objective security criteria named 
by respondents as factors for their perceived security level. 
4.2 Subjective Security 
The statements on the open-ended question “What would you require to feel secure about using 
mobile payments?” were categorized into statement groups and these aggregated to categories 
according to the exploration process described in section 3. 3930 respondents expressed in all 4998 
statements, whereas only 2413 chose the given possibility to state “no response”. In case of a 
respondent stated more than one security issue, the statements were disaggregated and each was put in 
its respective statement group. Afterwards statement groups were aggregated to overriding categories. 
The analysis of data results in 15 categories with very different frequencies; the latter allows for 
conclusions about the importance of the respective subjective security features for customers. 
The most frequent category was confidentiality with 646 answers. Above all, this category comprises 
the statement groups data protection (241), data security (159), unauthorized access (62) and no data 
transfer (61).  
The second category is encryption with 611 answers. It includes just two main statement groups: 
general demand for encrypted data transfer (539) and concrete answer of an encryption level or 
procedure (72); the latter summarizes statements as “128 / 256 / 512 bit”, “SSL” or “PKI”. 
The third category consists of statements which only contained the tautological declaration “security” 
(586). 
Transparency and traceability of the MP procedures play an important role for the subjective security 
feeling. This category contains 578 statements, main statement groups are traceability of costs (149), 
traceability of account (139) and confirmation of payment (116).  
Authentication and authorization as a further important security category was named by 424 
statements wherein the most stated by far was using PIN (personal identification number) and/ or TAN 
(transaction number) (303). Other statement groups were authentication (39), authorization (16) and 
unambiguous identification (49). Herein, mostly particular methods were named such as password 
enquiry.  
The category trust in MPSP (109) mainly contained the statement groups MPSP has to be reliable (92) 
and MPSP has to be familiar (79), the claim for safety guarantees (54) and the availability of an 
information service for customers (37).  
Fraud protection (202) includes some detailed statements concerning integrity (41), protection against 
hackers (39) or no possibility of unauthorized usage (27). 
The category anonymity was only named in 70 statements. This may seem surprising as the feature is 
an important issue in most discussions on MP security, however, this result confirms the respective 
outcome of the precedent survey MP1 (Khodawandi & Pousttchi & Wiedemann 2003). 
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In the first view it not obvious why respondents mentioned broad acceptance and diffusion as a 
security feature. One possible explanation could be that customers feel secure if many other customers 
use a certain payment procedure. Another explanation could be a broad acceptance by merchants. If 
many merchants offer the opportunity to pay with a particular procedure the customer will assume it to 
be secure. 
The category “others” includes a couple of smaller statement groups like comparisons with other 
payment procedures (69), amount limit (43) or trust in settlement (20) as well as a number of not 
attributable statements (36) and the statement none or low costs (105). As the latter statement is 
clearly off-topic it is subsumed under the category “others” – only regarding the frequency of 
statements it would be to place as an own category on rank 12. A possible explanation for this is that 
some respondents are supposed to use the first open-ended question to place emphasis on their most 
important feature for using an MP procedure. Table 2 shows the aggregated categories along with their 
frequency. 
 
Rank Category Frequency of statements 
1 Confidentiality 646 
2 Encryption 611 
3 Stating “security” 586 
4 Transparency and traceability 578 
5 Authentication and authorization 424 
6 Trust in MPSP 413 
7 Fraud protection 348 
8 Convenience and ease of use 298 
9 Secure infrastructure 263 
10 Liability issues 111 
11 Cancellation 107 
12 Third party certification 89 
13 Technical reliability 81 
14 Broad acceptance and diffusion 76 
15 Anonymity 70 
16 Others 297 
 Total number of statements 4998 
Table 2. Resulting categories for the dimension subjective security 
4.3 Implications 
The results of section 4.2 allow for certain implications, especially recommendations to (prospective) 
MPSP. 
First of all, on account of the large number of voluntary answers, it can be concluded that respondents 
are interested in expression of their opinion to this subject. Strongest doubts concerning security 
features were mentioned in the category confidentiality, especially in the statement group data 
protection. This empirically confirms the respective assumption of Pousttchi, Selk and Turowski 
(2002). The naming of encryption as second most named security feature is a confirmation and 
concretization of this trend. The concrete answers are also technical features as a diversion and 
strengthening of data protection. These provide an MPSP with evidence where he has to start the 
efforts to achieve a security feeling for the customers.  
A very large number of respondents indicated “security” (or a similar statement) as most important 
feature for them to feel secure. This tautological answer allows for the conclusion that these customers 
do have a need for security which is strong – according to the generally high importance of security in 
the survey results (Eisenmann & Linck & Pousttchi 2004) – but somewhat undetermined. An 
important mean to provide subjective security at that point is marketing activity, especially the 
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creation and/or use of brands. Other MP2 results indicate that especially the existing brands of banks 
are suited for this purpose (Eisenmann & Linck & Pousttchi 2004). An attempt to create a respective 
MNO-owned brand accompanied the renaming of the Mobile Payments Service Association (MPSA) 
in Simpay2. 
The category transparency and traceability defines clear requirements to the provider: Respondents 
demand knowledge as a condition to control and the MPSP has to provide this knowledge. MP 
documentation especially with the feature confirmation is desired. The availability of transparency and 
traceability has considerable advantages. 
Authorization is also a clear requirement that is to be met by the MPSP. Password enquiry and use of 
PIN and TAN are the most stipulated forms. 
Trust in the MPSP is an important (subjective) security feature which was already stated by 
Khodawandi, Pousttchi and Wiedemann (2003). This can be empirically corroborated by our results. 
Again here, the use of a bank’s brand name makes sense. 
The claim for fraud protection results from the general human fear of misuse and fraud. MPSP has to 
accredit the user. While the objective solution to this issue is technical, the subjective concern should 
be answered utilizing marketing techniques in order to state that fraud protection can be taken for 
granted. 
Desire for convenience and ease of use in conjunction with security leads to the conclusion that users 
do not feel secure if they do not understand an MP procedure. Frequently this item was mentioned 
along with the items secure and quick. Statements belonging to this category often recurred in 
combination with the statement “secure” (153). This forms a general claim for MP procedures to be 
easy to use, secure and quick. 
With the statements belonging to secure infrastructure, respondents ask for objectively revisable 
technical features. Here again, the MPSP is postulated to supply the want of the user and to give notice 
to this. 
Also liability issues are a necessity on the part of the user. Respondents want to have information 
about the consequences in case of fraud; especially they want to be protected against the risk of loss. 
Thus the knowledge of the contingencies (in the best case shaped favorable to the user) promotes 
subjective security.  
Cancellation also concerns the after-payment process. The user wants to be protected against the risk 
of loss. According to the system of the bank, mistakes on either side in erroneous entry should be 
possible to adjust. 
The demand of third party certification is easy to satisfy by using advertisement and publication of 
certificates. It is, however, named in a relatively low number of statements. Additionally, this demand 
for independent experts leads to the conjecture that users feel insecure and not competent; thus they 
may be affected by marketing measures. 
Just a few of the users express concrete doubts on technical reliability. These may feel more 
competent and rely merely on the objective security of the system. Nearly the same number of 
respondents called the broad acceptance and diffusion as main security feature. These users probably 
belong to the group of laggards which are not supposed to use such a system in the current (early) 
phase anyway.  
The last feature in the list is anonymity which is often considered as an important security feature. In 
our empirical study this proposition can be disproved. According to these results anonymity can be 
nearly disregarded in consideration of security of MP procedures from the customers’ viewpoint.  
                                              
2 This vertical alliance of Orange, Telefonica Moviles, T-Mobile and Vodafone stopped its activities in June 2005. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we examined security issues in MP from the viewpoint of the customer. We distinguished 
the dimensions of objective and subjective security. It is easy to operationalize the first one as this is 
only a special case of IT security (and the examination of existing MP procedures shows that objective 
security can almost be regarded as a given). Despite that, customers don’t feel safe even if they could 
do so – the real security problem is the missing subjective security. 
The outcome of the paper is an empirically devised set of dimensions, categories and aspects which is 
suitable to serve as a basis for the selection of appropriate indicators for further empirical studies. We 
will use them for our next study MP3 in order to examine the influence of the subjective security on 
the intention to use a mobile payment procedure. Furthermore we drew conclusions and gave 
recommendations for MPSP to prevent security concerns through appropriate design and 
communication of the payment procedures and to convince customers of the security of their MP 
procedures by meeting their concerns in informative advertising. 
MPSP must meet security requirements; otherwise customers will ignore the respective payment 
procedure. It is however important to realize that security is an essential condition, not a 
commensurate one. Fulfilling all essential conditions causes a customer to accept an MP procedure as 
a usable method of payment in principle (and thus, at least, not to exclude its usage), while fulfilling 
one of the commensurate conditions could turn, then, this acceptance into actual usage. Beneath 
security, further essential conditions are to be found in the area of cost and convenience (e.g. Kreyer, 
Pousttchi & Turowski 2002a). On many markets a further important requirement from the customer 
side is the universality of a payment procedure (Pousttchi 2005). 
Build on this foundation, MPSP must try for meeting the commensurate condition for actual MP usage 
– the creation of added values for the user. 
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